… all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their feelings and interests may be better understood and attended to. 

Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 35

… the executive department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the Constitution. … The great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of war or recommended by Congress or the Commander in Chief. … In most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the known sentiments of the legislative department.

James Madison in Federalist No. 48

… the most productive system of finance will always be the least burthensome.

Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 35

The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.

James Madison in Federalist No. 47

… the federal senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpation, into an independent and aristocratic body; we are warranted in believing that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the house of representatives with the people on their side will at all times be able to bring back the constitution to its primitive form and principles.

James Madison in Federalist No. 63

Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. … The great interests of the nation have suffered … from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests and views of the particular States.

James Madison in Federalist No. 46

Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most particularly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms an unusual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.

Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 74

The Federal and State Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes.

James Madison in Federalist No. 46

… who can think it possible that the president and two-thirds of the senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross and invidious to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the [ruling] so obtained … would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the laws of the nations.

John Jay in Federalist No. 64

If the federal Government is to have collectors of revenue, [they] will principally be on the sea-coast.

James Madison in Federalist No. 45